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Abstract
Background: Following the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health, Canada was among the first countries globally to amend its patent law, which
resulted in Canada's Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR). CAMR allows the production and
export of generic drugs to developing countries without the requisite manufacturing capacity to
undertake a domestic compulsory license. CAMR has been the subject of much criticism lodged at
its inability to ensure fast access to urgent medicines for least developing and developing countries
in need. Only recently did the Canadian government grant Apotex the compulsory licenses
required under CAMR to produce and export antiretroviral therapy to Rwanda's population.
Methods: The objective of this research is to investigate whether the CAMR can feasibly achieve
its humanitarian objectives given the political interests embedded in the crafting of the legislation.
We used a political economy framework to analyze the effect of varied institutions, political
processes, and economic interests on public policy outcomes. In-depth, semi-structured interviews
were conducted with nineteen key stakeholders from government, civil society and industry.
Qualitative data analysis was performed using open-coding for themes, analyzing by stakeholder
group.
Results: CAMR is removed from the realities of developing countries and the pharmaceutical
market. The legislation needs to include commercial incentives to galvanize the generic drug
industry to make use of this legislation. CAMR assumes that developing country governments have
the requisite knowledge and human resource capacity to make use of the regime, which is not the
case. The legislation does not offer sufficient incentives for countries to turn to Canada when
needed drugs may be procured cheaply from countries such as India. In the long term, developing
and least developing countries seek sustainable solutions to meet the health needs of their
population, including developing their own capacity and local industries.
Conclusion: CAMR is symbolically meaningful but in practice, limited. The Rwanda case will be
noteworthy in terms of the future of the legislation. To meet its intended international health
objectives, this legislation needs to be better informed of developing country needs and global
pharmaceutical market imperatives. Finally, we contend that serious public policy change cannot
strike a balance between all vested interests. Above all, any feasible policy that aims to facilitate
compulsory licensing must prioritize public health over trade or economic interests.
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Background
Following the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health [1], Can-
ada was among the first countries globally to amend its
patent law and as such created Canada's Access to Medi-
cines Regime (CAMR) [2]. Passed in 2004, CAMR allows
the production and export of generic drugs to developing
countries without the requisite pharmaceutical manufac-
turing capacity to undertake a domestic compulsory
license. Despite its worthwhile humanitarian goals,
CAMR is fraught with deficiencies, as critics elsewhere
have discussed [3,4]. These include a complicated applica-
tion process for countries to undertake, a limited list of
eligible medicines, restrictions on NGOs as eligible
importers, requirements to declare a national emergency
and restrictions that prevent re-exportation to facilitate
bulk procurement. Some argue that these restrictions go
above and beyond what is required by the WTO Para-
graph 6 Decision [4].
Since its implementation, no pharmaceuticals have been
exported to a country in need, although recent events sug-
gest this situation may change quickly. In July 2007,
Rwanda became the first country to attempt to use the
regime by notifying the World Trade Organization of its
intention to import a shipment of a triple fixed-dose
antiretroviral therapy from Apotex, a Canadian generic
drug manufacturer [5]. On September 19, the Canadian
patent commissioner granted Apotex a compulsory
license to produce and export this drug, which is held
under patents by three different companies, GlaxoSmith-
Kline (GSK), Shire, and Boehringer Ingelheim [6]. If suc-
cessful, these efforts will result in the delivery of 260,000
packs of antiretroviral therapy to Rwanda, which would
be enough to treat 21,000 patients for one year [6].
Although it is still not clear how the drug will be distrib-
uted, this represents some promise for legislation and it
would be watched closely by health policy makers and
activists given it will be the first test case of CAMR and the
WTO Paragraph 6 Decision.
Global drug access research is multidisciplinary in scope,
but there is a growing interest in how political economy
can have an impact on drug access. Much of this literature
focuses on the international politics of the TRIPS negotia-
tions and bilateral trade negotiations, and their impact on
public health outcomes. For example, F.M. Abbott ana-
lyzed the WTO negotiation strategies and policy context
which led to the current shape of the Paragraph 6 Deci-
sion [4]. His analysis illustrates the effects of coercive eco-
nomic and political power on the outcome of these
negotiations. More recently, Kerry and Lee analyzed glo-
bal policy debates on TRIPS and bilateral trade agree-
ments. They conclude that despite affirmation of the
Doha Declaration and the Paragraph 6 Decision in princi-
ple, their implementation is dramatically hindered by
inadequate capacity in low to middle income countries
and pressure from powerful trading partners to avoid
using such measures [7]. Our research on CAMR aims to
contribute this emerging literature by unpacking the lack
of stakeholder consensus on this issue, to identify where
the incongruence between the interest groups lie, and to
inform pharmaceutical public policy.
Research objectives
The objective of our research was to examine the percep-
tions and attitudes of CAMR's potential beneficiaries and
users towards CAMR. While the recent request by Rwanda
to Canada suggests that the legislation is operational, our
research aims to explore the potential of CAMR to reach
its objectives consistently and with global impact. We pur-
sue this by investigating what incentives it provides to
engage the cooperation of the private sector, what poten-
tial barriers and opportunities exist for developing coun-
tries to apply compulsory licensing, and by examining
how well CAMR serves developing countries' needs of
access to affordable medicines. Based on our findings, we
draw conclusions about how well CAMR may achieve its
objective as a legislation providing humanitarian aid – to
facilitate access to essential medicines in least developing
and developing countries with insufficient or no manu-
facturing capacity.
Methods
We used a political economy framework to analyze the
effect of varied institutions, political processes, and eco-
nomic interests on public policy outcomes. We assumed
that institutions are sources of predictability and credibil-
ity. Through this framework, we examined how political
and/or economic interests can impede or facilitate CAMR
from achieving its objective.
We conducted qualitative interviews and analysis to assess
stakeholder perceptions and attitudes to CAMR. We ana-
lyzed our data according to stakeholder group and coded
for major themes guided by the research objectives and
interview questions [8]. NVivo 7.0, a qualitative analysis
software program, was used to analyze the interview data.
We estimated a sample size of 4–6 people for each group,
based upon a similar study [9]; however we interviewed
with the goal of reaching theme saturation.
In total, we conducted 19 open-ended interviews with
stakeholders from different interest groups, including 4
health-policy-makers from developing countries, 5 offi-
cials from the Canadian Government, 2 representatives
from the Canadian generic pharmaceutical industry, 2
representatives from the research-based pharmaceutical
industry, 3 representatives from non-governmental organ-
izations, and 2 from international organizations. Inter-Globalization and Health 2007, 3:12 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/12
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views were conducted between July 2006 and October
2007, were conducted either face-to-face or over the tele-
phone, and ranged from 30 minutes to one hour in
length. Ethical approval was obtained from the University
of Toronto, Research Ethics Board in 2006. Informed con-
sent was obtained from all participants prior to the inter-
view. With the permission of the study participant,
interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim.
Selected checks on the accuracy of transcripts were con-
ducted prior to analysis.
To assess the stakeholders' positions, we explored their
views on intellectual property protection and its role in
global drug access. As well, stakeholders were asked to
describe their participation during the creation of CAMR,
and whether their interests were addressed.
Results
Developing countries
We found some common themes in our interviews regard-
ing the needs of developing countries; even though we
make the point that every country's situation is unique.
An underlying theme throughout the interviews was the
need to understand and appreciate the circumstances and
systems in beneficiary countries. For example, the devel-
oping country representative that was most familiar with
CAMR, found it an overly complex and unusable legisla-
tion. The lack of direct input into the legislative process
from developing country governments, who are the
intended beneficiaries of the legislation, was viewed as
problematic. As one developing country representative
notes:
"...I think that our view is simple: that the needs of
developing countries must be taken into considera-
tion any time international programs have been set
up, because the beneficiaries of the programs must be
able to be part of the planning process. And therefore,
if you're trying to increase access to medicines and
then you set up a new criteria and processes, that in
themselves becomes the barriers, and then we have
not done much"
Administratively, the CAMR assumes that developing
country governments have the requisite knowledge and
human resource capacity to make use of the regime. One
respondent emphasized the need for technical support to
better facilitate its use, however it must be tailored to the
specific needs of the country in question. Developing
country representatives are open to using CAMR to import
medicines, however their responses suggested that it
doesn't address their needs and that the incentives are not
there to warrant using the system.
"...Bill C-9 is limited to certain specific medicines that
some of them we do not really need. So, once you
issue a compulsory license, you also want to have the
one that gives you the maximum returns. I mean
cheaper in cost, and less administrative issues that sur-
round the problem..."
CAMR's limited list of drugs, modeled after the WHO
Essential Medicines List, appears to be a disincentive for
developing country beneficiaries as it includes many
drugs that are already available off-patent elsewhere.
Developing countries are interested in affordable second
and third-line antiretroviral therapy and antimalarial
agents, many of which may not currently be on the list.
Others suggested that drug needs vary depending on pat-
ent regimes in place, epidemiological profiles of a given
country and budget capacity.
"We also have to keep in mind that, when a popula-
tion has a higher life expectancy rate, chronic degener-
ative diseases will increase, and this will bring along
different treatment needs. Generally, we're visualizing
cancer will be on the rise for this reason and we'll
probably be needing more cancer drugs...drugs to treat
other degenerative diseases, diabetes, respiratory ill-
nesses, which need new molecules to bring any bene-
fits."
In our interviews, the developing country representatives
framed access not only as an issue of affordability, but
also one which demands consideration of sustainability
of treatment and supply. One policy-maker provided
examples of stock-outs in his country leading to interrup-
tion of treatment and subsequent increased drug-resist-
ance. He emphasized the challenges of ensuring
continuity of treatment in resource-limited countries that
cannot secure sustainable, affordable, quality pharmaceu-
ticals. One respondent viewed the development of their
local industry as a means of achieving sustainable drug
supply.
"...take for instance in my country, we also think that
you don't only give us fish because we want fish, but
you teach us how to do the fishing. Because as a coun-
try we must begin to think ten or fifteen years to count,
what would happen if we just continue to just import
from developed countries?"
Pharmaceutical industry
Generic industry
A theme emphasized by the generic drug industry in Can-
ada is that the legislation must provide better commercial
incentives in order to meet its policy objectives. The
"Good Faith Clause" requires that the average price of the
licensed drug be less than 25% of the equivalent patentedGlobalization and Health 2007, 3:12 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/12
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brand name drug in Canada, otherwise the generic com-
pany will be subject to litigation from the patent holder.
Companies viewed these provisions as subjecting them to
considerable liability for little economic benefit.
"...yes, they (generic drug companies) have some cor-
porate responsibility, obviously, they're drug compa-
nies with CSR, but passing legislation the way the
government did, which is intended to be non com-
mercial, and then saying they did wonderful things,
again, it's not realistic. You have international compa-
nies, who operate in Canada and say, why should I go
to Canada and lose money because the Canadian gov-
ernment has an objective."
Respondents acknowledged many other disincentives.
First, one disincentive is the cost associated with making
use of the legislation. Generic drug companies are
required to negotiate a voluntary license with potentially
multiple patent holders pursuant to this law. Respondents
described this as a lengthy, complex and expensive proc-
ess, with no time limit given to these requirements. Sec-
ond, it does not provide sufficient economic
compensation to generic drug companies so they will pur-
sue the legally costly compulsory license process. Third, in
the event that a company is committed enough to go for-
ward with a compulsory license, it is limited to only two
years, subject to a one-year renewal, and the quantity of
the license is limited to that which was originally applied
for by the country. Given the heavy front-end investment
demanded from generic companies, these limits do not
provide any prospect for a large or long-term market and
give these companies little incentive to engage in this leg-
islation. This is particularly the case if a company would
need to adjust and/or increase their manufacturing infra-
structure for products which are not normally part of their
product portfolio.
"Well, we might end up with a couple of orders, but at
the end of the day we won't make any money out of it,
and I'm going to get to a point where someone else
comes along, like [NGO], and say "we want this other
compound", I'm not going to be able to develop it,
because I'm in business to make money and I can only
do so many products."
A major drawback acknowledged was the lack of account-
ing for global market realities. Respondents acknowl-
edged that the vast majority of cheap, generic drugs are
being exported to least developing countries from coun-
tries with such as India, and Brazil. From a price-point,
Canadian producers are unable to compete given input
costs are significantly lower in these countries.
"My average production per person is $15 [in Canada]
and in India is under $1 an hour. The facilities that
we've put up in Canada; we've just put up $1 billion
into all these facilities to make the 20 million dos-
ages...I could have put that up in India for less than
$130 million. That's almost 10-fold the cost!"
Generic companies expressed their disappointment that
the Canadian government did not seek better counsel
from them in order to make this legislation work.
"...we've asked during the phase for the Canadian gov-
ernment actually partner with some of our companies
that were interested, and come on board, work with
us, take us through the system and then actually help
us, partner with us, either in terms of guaranteeing a
certain purchase, a certain quantity and price for the
product or helping us negotiate with the international
agencies and/or companies to help the generic find
partners. It's kind of a new business venture they're
asking companies to get into, but the Canadian gov-
ernment has been very unwilling to do that. They've
said no, we've passed the legislation, now you have to
figure it out."
Overall, respondents recognized that the impact of the
TRIPS Agreement on the generic pharmaceutical industry,
and in particular the Indian generic industry, would be
much more pronounced in the near future. In this sense,
they see the importance of the Paragraph 6 Decision and
CAMR. However, most respondents saw the TRIPS Agree-
ment and the Paragraph 6 Decision themselves as the fun-
damental frameworks requiring reform. Generally,
generic companies are discouraged about the prospects of
making this Paragraph 6 mechanism work.
Research-based industry
One of the key informants from the research-based phar-
maceutical company expressed support for the intent of
the legislation. This is congruent with the Canada's
Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies' (Rx&D) pub-
lic statements. He recognized the lack of success of the
regime and that this was problematic, however he empha-
sized that he is not raising specific concerns with the
regime. He viewed the industry's involvement with CAMR
as an opportunity to provide input and help shape the ini-
tiative towards the ultimate goal of achieving drug access.
The representative emphasized a need to achieve a bal-
ance between encouraging innovation and improving
access.
"We supported the WTO decision, and publicly con-
tinue to support it. So, did we want it to be the best
potential mechanism possible? Yes. Did we have some
potential concerns of what could happen and whatGlobalization and Health 2007, 3:12 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/12
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would actually be fruitful in terms of what's needed to
do? Yes, I think we raised a few of those questions. But
the ultimate position was of support, even publicly,
even until recently during the AIDS Conference. It's
also fair to say there's improving access, and there's the
need to balance that with encouraging innovation.
And I think that whenever you're in a discussion about
this type of issue, we're looking for that balance. But
the fact that the industry has publicly supported the
initiative highlights overall the position overtime."
The representative viewed the innovative industry's role as
a leader in improving drug access through drug and vac-
cine discovery and development, working in partnerships
and helping build infrastructure. He emphasized the view
that patents in many of these developing countries are not
an issue, and that the problem of access is multi-faceted,
with the lack of infrastructure as being critical. Still, he
acknowledged the lack of consensus on these issues and
suggested that the solution is to get all stakeholders mov-
ing towards the same goal.
"But I think that part of the challenge is to get every-
body moving in the same direction, the innovative
sector, the brand and generic sector. We also need the
support of the AIDS groups and the country in ques-
tion. I think we need a leadership role to be played
there, and, given the divergent interests and the people
involved... I think that people's intents are good, but
perhaps there needs to be an objective, detached party
to move them forward."
On the other hand, the second informant from the
research-based pharmaceutical industry expressed no sup-
port for CAMR, considering it based upon the false
premise that pricing is the main barrier for drug access.
According to this representative, the global drug market
debate has solved the issue of high priced drugs, and is
now focusing on achieving a sustainable drug supply
chain.
"The price issue is off the table... We've recognized that
part of the problem of access to medicines is resources,
health care capacities, infrastructure and access to sus-
tainable financing. We need to find one certain model
of efficiency on the ground into how to actually dis-
tribute the medicines... [such as] setting up a network,
a flow chart of health care."
This representative viewed CAMR as the result of a politi-
cal agenda, as opposed to addressing the main issue of
enhancing equitable drug access. Canadian generic com-
panies have unrealistic expectations from CAMR and they
have no experience with the complex realities of develop-
ing country markets.
"I'm not blaming the government at the time...Politics
sometimes trumps policy, and this is a great example
of politics, pure politics trumping sensible and sound
policy."
The informant emphasized that Canada should instead
focus on delivering organized, well-informed programs
that would match the 0.7% Gross Domestic Product des-
tined to foreign aid previously promised.
International organizations
There was clear lack of confidence regarding the potential
impact of this legislation from both representatives of
international aid organizations.
Although the first informant conceded that the legislation
and the larger WTO Paragraph Six decision were impor-
tant steps towards enhancing global access to medicines,
she believed that the CAMR will have limited impact.
"...it's a really narrow slice of the piece....being a nar-
row slice, I meant more than in terms of Canada, we've
done this, and we've done a great thing. They've done
a great thing to help a few countries, but it's not such
a huge step."
"The value of the Canadian legislation is only as good
and strong and useful as what each country has in
terms of its own legislation and as much as they feel
empowered to take advantage of those compulsory
licensing arrangements. And not a lot of countries do;
you have to be a pretty strong country to do it."
Intellectual property protection was cited as necessary for
companies to make advances in new products, such as
AIDS and cancer drugs, but she said that countries focus
first on access to drugs on the essential medicines list,
which are largely off-patent. The issue of access is multi-
faceted and many of the barriers exist in developing coun-
tries themselves: regulatory issues, high taxes/tariffs on
imported drugs, manufacturing practices, licensed phar-
macists, legislation for market authorization, integrity of
the drug supply, and corruption.
"...even if tomorrow all prices are cut in drugs, that's
not going to solve the entire problem."
The second representative favored the TRIPS agreement,
but recognized that compulsory licensing should be used
only as a last resource after all other negotiations with pat-
ent holders have failed. Since it reduces incentives for fur-
ther drug research and innovation, compulsory licensing
must be carefully monitored.Globalization and Health 2007, 3:12 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/12
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According to this informant, CAMR could achieve a signif-
icant global impact only if it is implemented in conjunc-
tion with remaining problems in drug access, including
the need for more efficient drug regulation, professional
training and health services improvement. The Canadian
legislation does not address these important issues and
lacks a general consensus from all parties involved in the
process.
Civil society
Most civil society representatives were in agreement with
the intent of the legislation but highly critical of the legis-
lation in its current form. The barriers highlighted by civil
society were consistent with those cited by the generic
drug industry over the lack of commercial incentive, and
concerns of developing countries with respect to their
health system issues and broader country contexts. Con-
cerns about the drug list, the voluntary license negotia-
tions, the limited list of medicines and limits on duration
and quantity were also emphasized. These were seen as
disincentives to both the generic industry and developing
countries. Even though Apotex is moving forward with a
plan to export drugs to Rwanda, the legislation is still
viewed as cumbersome to put in use and not viewed
favourably civil society. As one health activist noted:
"It's one drug, for one country and it's taken us from
April 2004 to say April 2007, that's three years to get
one drug for one country. And it's only a compulsory
license to 150000 tablets, which will actually treat 200
people for two years."
The lack of interest until recently by developing countries
was attributed to many factors. The process that develop-
ing countries must go through to obtain drugs under the
CAMR was seen as largely unrealistic.
"Well, it's obvious that nobody's interested. A country
that has got a huge death rate from AIDS, they don't
have the time or resources to go through this with
every single drug a country like Tanzania, you have
one person working on international intellectual
property."
That no drug is currently available for purchase through
CAMR is also seen as a barrier to garnering the interest of
potential countries. And the fact that countries must
notify the WTO before using the system was seen as a key
barrier.
"A country that wants to do this has to stick its neck
out, and make an order, and say to the world, and to
the Canadian government, 'We intend to use the WTO
system, specifically Canada's....' and there will be an
immediate backlash when they do this...certainly not
before there's a tangible product that they're going to
get at the end of the day."
Donor influence on pharmaceutical procurement proce-
dures was also cited. Bilateral donors may attach condi-
tionalities with respect to procurement. Others, such as
the World Bank, typically require that countries undertake
international competitive bidding for the purchase of
pharmaceuticals. The Canadian legislation simply does
not fit within those restrictions and does not provide
enough incentive to justify breaking these donor arrange-
ments.
"If I'm sitting here, and I'm in Malawi, and I've got
$200 million annually from the US for drugs as long
as I buy patent drugs, do you think I'm going to thumb
my nose at that? It's part of the bigger architecture."
Related to this is the perception of an inactive govern-
ment. Most civil society groups stated that the government
needs to do much more on both the supply and the
demand sides. This involvement includes working with
developing country bureaucrats and officials, providing
technical assistance, and working with donors in those
countries to ensure that the regime works within the
donor requirements.
"Those that don't have the manufacturing capacity
often don't have the negotiating capacity with strong
donor groups. Therefore government of Canada needs
to do some strong advocacy and work with the rest of
the donor group to help the country use that."
Canadian federal government
Overall, bureaucrats were reluctant to label the CAMR as
either effective or not. They emphasized the difficulty of
creating legislation true to the WTO Doha Accord without
having a precedent to follow. Generally, bureaucrats felt
that the CAMR was an important policy to give effect to
the global trade mechanism and encourage other coun-
tries to follow suit. However, they recognized that the pol-
icy was wanting in parts and deferred to the review process
as an effective mechanism to evaluate the problems and
amend accordingly.
One bureaucrat speculated that the lack of use of the
CAMR was largely a problem on the developing country
side. Countries show interest in the legislation but they
are not notifying the Canadian Commissioner of Patents
of their intent to use the legislation. While no definitive
reasons were given, he speculated as to whether there was
a lack of clarity on WTO or Canadian notification, pres-
sure from stable pharmaceutical providers not to notify,
or a disconnect between CAMR and a country's economic
goals.Globalization and Health 2007, 3:12 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/12
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"A lot of their industrial goals are not to have any
drugs shipped from Canada, but to build their domes-
tic capacity. So a lot of them brought up that issue; the
waiver is interesting, but our primary concern is to
build a supply in our own country."
Moreover, the problems are seen as less of an issue with
the CAMR as they are a function of the international archi-
tecture of the WTO Agreement.
"The problem is not as much domestic. They [a generic
company] haven't applied to the Commissioner for a
license because they need a country to notify them...
So the problem is the international machinery, and
look, if you're going to change the world and the wait
works commercially, you can't do it in a week."
Bureaucrats view themselves as actively disseminating
information and engaging countries, companies, and pri-
vate foundations. But they are aware that the legislation
does not provide sufficient commercial incentives for the
generic drug industry.
"A lot of the companies are now controlled by interna-
tional boards, so when the provisions first came
through, we got a meeting with 5–6 CEOs of the major
generic companies, and we brought them through the
process and how you would need to apply. We had a
frank discussion about whether they would partici-
pate. The prevailing thought was, there was a lot of
commercial risk involved, they would very likely not
be able to convince their boards to embark on that
kind of thing, so there was very little interest because
it's commercially risky, there's really not much point
for them."
An opposition party politician assumed a very critical
position, seeing the legislation as a policy failure.
"I don't want to have this legislation as a political
shield that says we're contributing to humanity in
developing nations when they can't really make use, or
the bill doesn't provide the remedy at the end of the
day. ....If it stays the current way and we can't get any
drugs to anybody, then I think it's one of the worst
pieces of legislation ever passed in Parliament. It just
allows us to say we're so good and so humanitarian,
and by the way, you really can't use it."
A majority party politician remained more impartial on
the success of the CAMR, acknowledging that if it wasn't
working, something had to be done. She emphasized the
importance of protecting intellectual property, share-
holder investments and encouraging innovation.
"At the same time, you have to also protect those pat-
ents, because you have people, ordinary people, ordi-
nary Canadians who are not wealthy that may invest
$1000 or whatever, and hold one or two shares in a
variety of companies, including maybe pharmaceuti-
cal-based, research-based pharmaceuticals. They have
a right to have their investment protected, and try to
make some money off of it. It's perfectly justifiable. So
the companies have an obligation to their sharehold-
ers, because those are the ones who provided the cap-
ital that they then used to actually do the research...."
Yet, the politician clearly stated that if the bill isn't work-
ing, it should be reassessed and amended to be more
effective.
Discussion
CAMR seeks to reconcile both commercial and humani-
tarian goals but it has yet to succeed on both accounts. For
the primary users of the legislation – developing country
representatives and the generic drug industry – CAMR fails
to adequately address their needs. The legislation needs to
include commercial incentives to galvanize the generic
drug industry to make use of this legislation. While Apo-
tex has demonstrated good will by agreeing to manufac-
ture medicines for Rwanda, it remains to be seen if this is
a one off event or if this will be a more long-lasting
arrangement. If, and only if, it is the latter, then the legis-
lation may be of value towards ensuring sustainable phar-
maceutical supply.
From the perspective of developing country representa-
tives, the intended beneficiaries of this legislation, CAMR
is almost inaccessible. To be sure, the complexity of the
regime may be attributed in part to the TRIPS Agreement.
Some interviewees acknowledged that international trade
agreements themselves, which CAMR is situated within,
are responsible for barriers. Still, critics agree that these
international mechanisms must be simplified to better
enable low to middle income countries to use compulsory
licensing and other TRIPS flexibilities [4]. Given these cir-
cumstances, the Canadian legislation took a complicated
regime and, based upon our findings, made it even more
complex.
The CAMR works on the assumption that developing
country governments have the requisite knowledge and
human resource capacity to make use of the regime seam-
lessly. In crisis situations, government officials will not
opt to deal with cumbersome administration in order to
get drugs to those in need. They will seek expeditious and
simple solutions to stop people from dying or being sick
from lack of access to medicines. Furthermore, the legisla-
tion does not offer sufficient incentives for countries to
turn to Canada for help when needed drugs may be pro-Globalization and Health 2007, 3:12 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/12
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cured cheaply from another source country, such as India,
which has very competitive prices and has also amended
its patent law to act as a source country for countries want-
ing to make use of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health.
In the long term, developing and least developing coun-
tries seek sustainable solutions to meet the health needs
of their population. Many despite the economic costs
want to build up their own capacity to produce medicines
and develop their local industry so that drug supply can
be assured nationally and there is no dependence on
external supply. This requires however the requisite tech-
nology transfer which has been limited at best pursuant to
the TRIPS Agreement. Measures such as CAMR and the
Paragraph 6 Decision are intended to be stop gap meas-
ures – policy instruments to address urgent and present
needs that are otherwise unfulfilled. A balance, however
elusive, needs to be struck between trying to address the
access crisis in a timely manner while developing the nec-
essary foundations for sustainable access and treatment.
Governments, like Canada, can fill this role by offering
assistance to relevant sectors including trade and industry
to increase their technical capacity, which is in fact
required by the TRIPS agreement.
International development to succeed must have local
input and be mindful of variation in country needs. This
is an approach, which has long been advocated by devel-
opment agencies. Still, this legislation appears to be out-
dated and out of synch by imposing a"one-size" fits all
approach to drug access. We found that there is a common
perception that the legislation has not reflected the health
and economic priorities of developing countries. There
needs to be sufficient counsel from developing countries
themselves and they need to be involved in the planning
process to ensure the content and the process of the legis-
lation works seamlessly in their favour. Canada's inten-
tion to correct an unfair trade regime, one that was clearly
not in the interest of developing countries, is at a cursory
level positive, but unless realistic and appropriate incen-
tives are in place, the legislation will simply be an interna-
tional embarrassment.
The brand name industry's perception, as reflected by our
results, that high prices are not the main barrier to drug
access is indicative of their position on CAMR and com-
miserate with global policy debates. While this study illus-
trates that there are many key components to ensuring
drug access in developing countries, results also showed
that the affordability of pharmaceuticals remains a prob-
lem. Industry's strong resistance towards allowing ample
flexibility in intellectual property law to achieve public
health objectives has been clearly shown in the past.
Given these entrenched interests, meaningful policy that
aims to reconcile intellectual property protection and
access to medicines cannot be realistically founded upon
consensus between all stakeholders. Effective policy
requires leadership and courage on behalf of the govern-
ment to make amendments and provisions necessary to
create the market conditions necessary to stimulate the
flow of drugs into these countries. This will take creating
policy that prioritizes humanitarian over commercial
goals.
Results should be considered in the context of the study's
limitations. First, our study focused on perceptions of
CAMR but did not evaluate the application of CAMR
directly. An evaluation of the current Apotex-Rwanda case
would be ideal to examine the technical problems of the
legislation; however this was not our objective. We aimed
to capture a multiple stakeholder critique of CAMR's over-
all goals as well as its policy design, by incorporating
broad, global perspectives on drug access along with those
more intimately familiar with the specifics of CAMR. Sec-
ond, we interviewed with the goal of theme saturation,
however our sample size was limited by recruitment and
project constraints. We aimed to achieve a diversity of
views across the five stakeholder groups, which we believe
represent a multiple-faceted view of the issues at hand.
Conclusion
Based on our findings, CAMR appears to be more power-
ful symbolically than in practice. The planned export of
generic antiretroviral medicines to Rwanda suggests that
the legislation may prove to be more workable than orig-
inally anticipated. It is still too early to determine this and
this case needs to be examined closely in order to draw a
more conclusive view. Nonetheless, we still contend that
to meet its intended international health objectives, this
legislation needs to be better informed of developing
country needs and global pharmaceutical market impera-
tives. It must be simple to implement and address the vital
issue of drug sustainability. This would likely include
components related to facilitating local production and
technology transfer, and of course, specific country needs.
Finally, we contend that serious public policy change can-
not strike a balance between all vested interests. It is
almost impossible to derive fundamental policy change
that will satisfy all vested groups. Here, CAMR must
remain faithful to the Doha Accord and ensure that public
health is kept as the priority.
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